July 29, 2012
[I was recently in an argument, over at An und fur sich, about Zizek’s politics – the relevant posts are here and here. After a time Adam Kotsko closed comments; since the last of my comments didn’t make it through moderation I thought I’d paste it here. Comment is below.]
Right. Here’s the quote from Zizek’s article again:
the critical statement that patriarchal ideology continues to be today’s hegemonic ideology IS today’s hegemonic ideology – its function is to enable us to evade the deadlock of the hedonist permissiveness which is effectively hegemonic.
Adam initially (in this comment) apparently parsed Zizek’s statement as claiming simply that patriarchy is not hegemonic. But this is not what the statement says: the statement says also that critique of patriarchy “IS today’s hegemonic ideology”. I pointed this out here.
Adam then responded as follows:
There’s a difference between the claim that mainstream liberals like to shadow-box against the kind of forthright bigots and sexists who are actually a fringe element in American society and directly identifying with those bigots and sexists as the real victims! I don’t think Zizek is doing the latter, at all. [CORRECTION: Obviously in the piece on the Roma, Zizek is identifying with the bigots as the real victims. But I don’t think he usually does that.]
It seems to me that the hardcore Fox News Republicans are a small but vocal subculture that succeeds precisely because of the phenomenon Zizek pinpoints — the tendency for liberals to be satisfied with themselves as long as they’ve established that they’re not like those crazy conservatives.
This is a little difficult to parse in relation to the discussion of Zizek’s statement, because it again doesn’t appear to be putting forward the same claim. Adam seems to be saying:
1) I am accusing Zizek of “identifying with the victims” of the holders of the patriarchal (or substitutes) ideology that is not hegemonic but that still has power.
2) Forthright bigots and sexists [and/or ‘hardcore Fox News Republicans’ which I take it is meant to pick out roughly the same set of people?? though maybe not?] are “actually a fringe element in American society”.
[OK, on this. I’m not sure why we’re specifically talking about American society suddenly, when that’s not the focus of the Zizek or Ahmed pieces in question. But second, I don’t see any very obvious sense in which this is true. On the ‘hardcore Fox News Republicans’, it depends I guess what you mean by ‘hardcore’ – which can be meant in narrow or broad ways (so some sense of this sentence will certainly be true, but not necessarily usefully so). It should be clear that regularly-Fox-News-watching-Republicans are not a fringe element in US society. As a back-of-the-envelope calculation, there are about 55 million registered members of the Republican party, which is about 26% of the adult US population. According to Pew, “40% of Republicans say they regularly watch Fox News”. And also according to Pew, about 39% of those who regularly watch Fox News identify as Republican, and about 49% as leaning Republican. Let’s go with 40% of 55 million, to get 22 million Republican party members who are also regular Fox News watchers: more than 10% of the US adult population. Presumably you have a narrower category of folk in mind with your ‘hardcore’ Fox News Republicans – but that qualifier is having to do an awful lot of work here. I don’t think the statement is persuasive without some pretty idiosyncratic senses of at least some of its terms.
On “forthright bigots and sexists”, again, it obviously depends how we understand the qualifier ‘forthright’. Still sticking with the US (for some reason) a pretty superficial google search gives me this paper, which has some useful graphs tracking various survey responses in the US from the late 70s onwards. (There’s obviously going to be heaps of excellent work in this area; I just don’t know it.) Basically attitudes to gender roles get a lot more egalitarian until the early ’90s, at which point everything plateaus. So, for instance, in the last dataset represented there (from 2008), about 70% of respondents disagreed with the claim that men are better politicians than women. That could obviously be a lot worse – but it’s hard to see it justifying the claim that the critique of patriarchy is hegemonic.
On racism (which I’ll take as an initial proxy for your ‘bigotry’, just to stop this comment blowing out indefinitely), it’s equally obviously not the case that forthright bigots are a fringe population. I’ve exhausted my googling patience for now, so let’s leave the US behind – but here’s a report on survey data from eight European countries. An eye-watering 56.9% of Polish respondents believe that “Jews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind.” In Britain it’s a mere 22.5%. Still – 45.8% of Britons agree with the statement “Because of the number of immigrants, I sometimes feel like a stranger in [country]”. More than a third (34.6%) of UK respondents agree with the statement “There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people.” And so on. Bigotry is really common. (And it’s not as if the US is untarnished in this respect either.) I don’t think you’re coming from a very convincing place when you characterise forthright bigotry and sexism as ‘fringe’, even given the slightly hazy qualifier ‘forthright’.
But putting all that aside…]
3) “the phenomenon Zizek pinpoints” (in the sentence quoted above) is “the tendency for liberals to be satisfied with themselves as long as they’ve established that they’re not like those crazy conservatives.”
(This is the real point:) I can’t stress enough that this isn’t what Zizek is saying in the passage under discussion. Zizek is not saying, in this sentence that I quoted and that we are discussing, that liberals have a tendency to be satisfied with themselves as long as they’ve established that they’re not like those crazy conservatives. Zizek is saying that the critique of patriarchy is hegemonic. Again:
the critical statement that patriarchal ideology continues to be today’s hegemonic ideology IS today’s hegemonic ideology
Adam – you simply haven’t defended this statement. You have defended other statements that are somewhat but not very closely related. But this statement, that Zizek writes very plainly and that is a central claim of this piece (not at all incidental illustrative material) is:
a) untrue: the critical statement that patriarchal ideology continues to be today’s hegemonic ideology IS NOT today’s hegemonic ideology. (Neither is liberal multicultural tolerance, as Zizek also claims.)
b) reactionary, because (I am claiming) it is in fact reactionary to claim that anti-racism, anti-sexism, and “the critical statement that patriarchal ideology continues to be today’s hegemonic ideology” are themselves hegemonic. This is an empirically incorrect view that is nevertheless widely believed and articulated from within the (reactionary and widespread) viewpoint that sees itself and its privileges as under unjust assault by the partial victories of ‘identity’ politics: feminism, civil rights, GLBT rights, etc. (This is a perspective that Zizek’s work shares with Fox News.)
Now, further to the ‘political correctness’ issue, and on a factual point – Adam wrote upthread, in response to Adswithoutproducts: “I don’t recall any anti-P.C. swipes in Living in the End Times at all.” But the article we have been discussing is published in ‘Living in the End Times’. So no. One can also consult the index of ‘Living in the End Times’ to find page references for that work’s anti-P.C. swipes, such as this one, the first listed, from pages 38-39:
As every close observer of the deadlocks arising from political correctness knows, the separation of legal justice from moral Goodness – which should be relativized and historicized – ends up in an oppressive moralism brimming with resentment. Without any ‘organic’ social substance grounding the standards of what Orwell approvingly referred to as ‘common decency’ (all such standards having been dismissed as subordinating individual freedoms to proto-Fascist social forms), the minimalist program of laws intended simply to prevent individuals from encroaching upon one another (annoying or ‘harassing’ each other) turns into an explosion of legal and moral rules, an endless process (a ‘spurious infinity’ in Hegel’s sense) of legalisation and moralisation, known as ‘the fight against all forms of discrimination’. … In France, there are associations for obese people demanding that all public campaigns against obesity and in favour of healthy eating habits be stopped, since they damage the self-esteem of obese persons. The militants of Veggie Pride condemn the ‘speciesism’ of meat-eaters (who discriminate against animals, privileging the human animal – for them, a particularly disgusting form of ‘fascism’) and demand that ‘vegeto-phobia’ should be treated as a kind of xenophobia and proclaimed a crime. And we could extend the list to include those fighting for the right to incest-marriage, consensual murder, cannibalism…
Really this is not sophisticated argument – it is the same crass, hyperbolic, lazy, empirically inaccurate (has anyone ever used the phrase ‘vegeto-phobia’ in this sense except Zizek? Let’s check. No.) anti-‘p.c.’ polemic found in newspaper columns by Andrew Bolt or Richard Littlejohn – it just includes incidental references to Hegel, since Zizek’s audience is continental Theory nerds, rather than tabloid newspaper readers. It is not an “utterly ridiculous conspiracy theory” to place the stance articulated in these passages on the political right.
April 9, 2012
As readers of the blog (if such there be) will know, my current ongoing project (or, I suppose, sub-project) is a document on the implications of the work of Robert Brandom for social theory. I’m keen to get that document done, but it’s on the back-burner for now, while work and life take well-deserved priority. Still, things churn away in the brain cell, and I’ve been thinking a bit what the next thing to do is, once the Brandom document is complete.
My master-plan for the overall project has (as, again, readers may conceivably recall) six broad stages. The first three of these were, in order:
1) Social-theoretic foundations [the Brandom document]
2) History of capitalism
3) Analysis of value theory
(The remaining stages were, more or less, variations on ‘do political economy’)
I’d planned to move on to my (very brief!) history of capitalism once the Brandom document was done. My idea was that social theory and economic history were the broad areas of study that need to inform an adequate economics, but that are under-represented in current economics education – so I thought I’d get some basic grounding in these areas, before approaching economics itself.
My worry: if I do this, I’ll never get to the economics :-P. So: I’ve had a rethink. I still intend to write a history of capitalism, but I’m now seeing this as something to do in the interstices of my other studies.
This leaves the question: what to move on to once the Brandom document is complete?
The way I currently see it, contemporary economics has two broad areas of technical expertise:
First, statistical analysis of economic data.
Second, modelling of economic structures.
And, of course (third, if you like), drawing connections between them.
Obviously each of these areas have their formal and contentful aspects – the formal being simply how to do statistical analysis or modelling; the contentful being analysis of actual economic data, or discussion of actual economic models.
I want to start getting to grips with these technical areas of economics sooner rather than later. My current background concern is: how. I’m considering taking a higher degree in statistics – or just autodidacting may way through the terrain, as usual. This will have the advantage of having real-world application (i.e. I can use it on the job market, which is important); and it has the further advantage that I have a lot of respect for orthodox statistical theory and practice (whereas I have very little respect for orthodox economic models and modelling) – so I’m less likely to flame out of these studies in the kind of bitter rage that motivates this blog as a space to do heterodox intellectual work. The downside is that statistics still isn’t economics proper – so it’s still a postponement of (what I regard as) the core of my project.
Just putting this up to externalise and help along the thought-process, really. Also to explain a shift in content on the blog – I’m still not blogging properly again, but I aim to starting putting up statistics-related content; this is why.
I hope folks out there are well.
June 19, 2011
With apologies, I’ve decided to put the blog into hiatus for a while. I’ve been really enjoying and valuing the conversations I’ve been participating in here and elsewhere – and I aim to continue those conversations that are presently in progress, as it were, although it may take me a little while to reply to people. Nevertheless, I think my time will, for some time, be better spent on tasks other than blogging.
Though there are real-world obligations I need to attend to, this isn’t a decision that’s entirely external to the content of the blog. I’ve been working for a long time now on how to understand the kinds of phenomena I was discussing in my most recent series of posts. Those posts, I feel, successfully articulate the central concepts of the theory of practice I endorse. That is to say, they fulfil the principal task I set myself as the first part of my broader project – at least to my own satisfaction.
Now there’s a world of difference between fulfilling an intellectual task to one’s own satisfaction, and fulfilling it to anyone else’s satisfaction. One of the things I’ve learned in my participation in this online community of intellectual discussion, is that the work of articulation and persuasion is the bulk of the work involved in intellectual practice (although the work of articulation can often involve a solidification and, at times, a transformation of conceptual content, and so cannot be fully separated from the work of thought).
I have a lot more to do, in other words, in the elaboration and detailed articulation of the practice-theoretic perspective I advocate. I’ll aim to continue that work when I start blogging here again – along with other things. However, this theoretical perspective is also something that I’ve been wanting to nail down, to my own satisfaction, for a long time, for other reasons, and before attempting various other tasks. Now that I’ve done that, I’m going to shift personal focus towards some non-intellectual matters. At the moment I’m thinking of spending a year or so away from blogging, but that’s a rather arbitrary guess.
I’m sad about this – I’ll miss blogging and, especially, interacting with people in this online community, very much. At the same time, I think this is a good decision.
In lieu of new content I thought I’d link to the bloggers I’ve found most value in reading or interacting with over the last few years. Which of these you’ll enjoy depends on why you read the blog, but they all intersect with the work done here in one way or another.
Dead Voles – Carl Dyke and company
Deontologistics – Pete Wolfendale
Ktismatics – John Doyle
Limited, Inc. – Roger Gathman
The Luxemburgist – Reid Kane’s political blog
Planomenology – Reid Kane’s philosophy blog
Qlipoth – multiple authors
Rough Theory – N Pepperell
What In The Hell – Nate H
I’m also going to link again to Martin Jolly’s most recent music, because it is remarkable, and not enough people have clicked through.
Thank you for reading. 🙂
November 17, 2010
As I said a few posts back, I started blogging more than three years ago in a state of considerable turmoil and distress. In an early post I quoted Bellow’s Herzog, which captures something of the seething inner frenzy of thoughts and associations that the blog was meant to help articulate, externalise, and make available for reflection and action. In that department, blogging has succeeded pretty much beyond my wildest dreams: when I started blogging, I had at my intellectual disposal a mass of unsystematic autodidactic reading, much of it literary; an undergraduate degree in analytic philosophy; an intense engagement with a handful of intellectual figures (e.g. Derrida; Freud); an intense and justified rage; and a desire to master the discipline and subject-matter of economics, without an understanding of which it seemed impossible to comprehend the social forces that make and destroy our lives; or to understand what among the world’s abundant horrors can and should effectively be contested, and how.
Out of that work of articulation has come a settled and long-term intellectual research project, the value of which I am confident in, and do not feel the need to defend (though I am happy to). To recapitulate, I see the long-term project as consisting in the following stages (I’ve said all of this before, so the blockquoted section below can be skipped):
1) Social-theoretic foundations. I want to establish, to my own satisfaction, the social-theoretic basis on which the analysis of complex social and economic structures can rely. That’s another way of saying that I want at least a sketch of a solid, scientifically legitimate theory of practice. I also want a mastery of the core texts of the social-theoretic canon, such that I can participate with some authority in social-theoretic discursive communities. I also feel it would be valuable and, given my intellectual background, plausible, to aim to articulate the philosophical reasons for accepting a theory of practice as foundational, in the way I advocate: that is, to participate in philosophical discussions of the status of social practice, etc. This latter is not a particularly central goal of the project, though. I’d like to produce at least one document that gives an account of the positions I advocate in these areas – not to do so would, I think, be a waste of a lot of work. On the other hand, these social-theoretic foundations are foundations, rather than the finished thing I’m building, so I don’t want to get too hung up on articulating this stuff.
2) History of capitalism. I’ve already discussed this in an earlier post – basically I want to produce a very short, very rough-and-ready history of capitalist society from about 900AD (i.e. well pre-capitalist) to the present day.
3) Value theory. Again, I’ve discussed this briefly elsewhere – I want to make a systematic study of different traditions of economic theory, comparing and contrasting approaches to the theory of value between and across traditions. This will involve articulating the theory of value that I myself aim to defend.
Those are the three core initial stages of the project. There’s other stuff I need to cover too – e.g. I ought to read some anthropology as part of the social-theoretic reading; I need to acquire a mastery of the central mathematical tools used in modern econ. But this stuff can be slotted into the category of ‘general further studies’. Basically the above three sub-projects I think cover the core foundational elements of the larger endeavour.
Of necessity, subsequent work is at present less clearly planned in outline – I expect it in large part to be determined by the results of 1-3 above. I think I can, however, sketch at least the general intent, since the later work is, after, all, the principal purpose of the project. Once 1-3 above are largely complete, therefore, I expect to turn to:
4) A more detailed engagement with contemporary economic theory. Critique of positions I regard as flawed; articulation and defense of positions I regard as correct.
5) Analysis of contemporary events. This will presumably have two components:
a) more International Relations / world-systems type analytic work.
b) more immediate commentary on stuff in the news, etc.
6) Discussion of proposals for economic institutional reform. I regard this last as by some distance the most practically important of the goals listed here. Again, I’ve discussed this briefly before on the blog, but to recapitulate still more briefly: I regard the proposal and analysis of institutional alternatives as by far the most practically helpful contribution intellectuals as intellectuals can make to the general left project of transforming society for the better. Further, I regard it as a really important and essential contribution, and a task that I think the left in general should spend a lot more time on than presently it does. I’m sure I’ll write on this again in the future, and obviously I can’t discuss this rather fraught set of issues now in the detail they deserve – but basically, there are a number of key things that have often gone wrong, historically, with attempts at large-scale emancipatory transformation of society: a) hard power wielded by the ruling class crushing the attempt. b) popular movements pushing for right, rather than left, politics (this can be framed as a problem of organisational strategy, but it’s clear that anti-establishments movements aren’t intrinsically leftist.) c) radicals who gain power fucking up, policy-wise. It’s c) that interests me in this department. It seems to me that bad institutional choices have often been made by powerful groups with radical left intent, and that while there are a lot of reasons for this, one of the important ones is that the radical left hasn’t spent nearly enough time discussing what concrete institutions it wants to implement, if and when it gets the chance (and we’re in a particularly barren period, for this, historically, now, I think). What do we actually want, in concrete institutional terms, and why? There are, of course, answers to this question being put forward – I’m obviously not suggesting that there’s a blank slate here. I am saying that I want to be able to provide my own answers to this question, in some detail; and also that I want, if I can, to help foster and participate in a more far-reaching debate on the left around this issue than presently exists.
There’s of course a lot more that I’d like to write about all of this stuff, even in this kind of outline form, but I’m going to leave it all aside for now. The above is a sketch of what I understand my intellectual project to be. I think it’s a potentially valuable one, and it’s a project I’m committed to. It’s also, obviously, a fucking huge project. I don’t think it’s unrealistically huge, given my age, abilities, and the average predicted human life-span for those in my demographic. But clearly there’s a lot that could happen – a lot of different kinds of things that could happen – to prevent me from completing these tasks. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to me to have these goals: a roll of the dice at not unacceptable odds.
Having established all of that, I want to talk a bit about the personal (social) affiliations I think this project involves. To my mind I am, in attempting this project, affiliating with two separate, though overlapping, broad communities of practice and discourse: first, the scientific community, specifically the social-scientific community (and as I’ll say at greater length eventually, I regard the social sciences as, in principle, legitimately affiliated with the broader scientific community – I don’t regard sociology or economics as intrinsically pseudo- or non-scientific, although both disciplines have serious and non-accidental problems.) Second, the socialist/communist/Marxist political community. As I say, I regard these affiliations as to a very large extent distinct: the bulk of my project is social scientific, and I aim to legitimate the claims I’ll be making (about value theory, or the history of capitalism, for example) on social-scientific, rather than partisan political grounds. The bottom line is: a fact is a fact, whatever one’s politics. (Saying this doesn’t mean that I deny that struggles over what criteria to apply in determining what we accept as fact are political; and of course I feel free to make judgements about the material I’m studying that wouldn’t be shared by those who disagree with me politically. Again, I’ll expand on these distinctions at some later date.) At the same time, the social-scientific work I aim to be doing is of course informed by my political convictions: what research topics I consider worthwhile pursuing, what aspects of my topics I look into, etc. – all this is informed by the potential political use I see this social-scientific research as having, down the road. I see my commitment to norms associated with social science, and my commitment to norms associated with socialist / Marxist politics, as informing each other but as non-identical (though also as compatible). I also should say that these are non-homogeneous communities of discourse/practice, and that membership of them partly involves participation in the ongoing debate about their nature practised by those in and outside the communities themselves. I plan to explore all this stuff in future posts.
This is all well and good. The point is that as I’ve been blogging these last few years, I take myself to have developed a solidity of focus, and a confidence in the legitimacy of a potentially achievable complex long-term intellectual project. What started as a highly exploratory working-through of intellectual preoccupations has coalesced into a focused – albeit wide-ranging – set of tasks. I expect to continue working on these long-term tasks, and to regularly publish updates on my progress. It’s reasonably likely that I’ll try to publish some of this material in a formal setting (though I’m obviously also a big believer of blogging as a legitimate and valuable mode of publication).
However, this focus only applies to my sense of the tasks I’ve outlined above, and of the intellectual space this endeavour inhabits. Thinking about the tasks I’ve outlined above, as I go about them in my day to day life, I know that in attempting them, and even more in discussing my results, I am inhabiting a specific, and quite narrow, set of social roles. These roles are ones that I feel I’ve spent much of the last three plus years acquiring mastery of, and I’m happy with the level of mastery acquired. Nevertheless, these roles, and the complexes of practice they inhabit, only make up a fraction, albeit a significant fraction, of my life – and in many ways, now that the chaos of Herzogian internal association has diminished, at least with respect to intellectual matters, these roles do not represent the most significant and pressing aspects of my thinking to myself.
All these preliminary remarks are by way of saying that I’m thinking of making a significant shift in the content of the blog. I’ll still, as I say, publish material related to the vast ongoing project, some of it formal in nature. But I’m also going to start publishing a lot more personal material on the blog. I’m unclear at present exactly how this is going to work out: I don’t have a clear sense in my head of the form the future blog will take. I expect a lot of it will still be fairly abstract and ‘theoretical’, given that that’s often how I actually think. But to a large extent I’m going to turn this into a personal blog.
What does that mean? Well, given that the blog is published under my name, I’m obviously not going to be putting up anything that would cause serious problems with either the law or with the institutions that provide my income. (Not that there’s anything that I think would cause such problems; I’m just saying.) Likewise, I plan to respect the privacy of my family and friends in a fairly rigorous way, which is going to hugely limit, practically speaking, the amount of personal stuff I can blog about. Quite apart from personality issues, then, the blog is of practical necessity probably going to involve a lot of internal ‘reflections’. When I started blogging, the blog was highly ‘exploratory’. Basically I’m going to reboot to that kind of exploratory approach, w/r/t personal, rather than intellectual matters.
Now, although I’m not planning on being hugely revealing, w/r/t private lives of people I know etc, I’m assuming that the blog will aim to be quite personally exposing, in terms of things like the affects and thought processes and aspects of self made public. In terms of your readerly experience, the blog will quite likely become fairly tedious – others’ self-explorations are rarely engaging. While there’ll still of course be some philosophical and Marxian social-theoretic material, the blog’s content will be significantly shifting towards reflections on days’ events, on my own feelings and personality, etc. To be completely clear, there’s absolutely no chance that I’ll be offended if you de-blogroll the blog (for example), now that the nature of its content has changed. On the other hand, I’ve got zero sympathy with potential complaints that the blog is now too self-absorbed, that it assumes others will be interested in the minutiae of my life or thinking, etc. It’s entirely your choice whether you read the blog or not; if you are bored or irritated by its newly personal nature, don’t read it. I’ve created a ‘personal’ category, so you can tell what kind of content you’re likely to encounter in a given post, if you wish.
Most of the writing that’s gone up on my blogs so far has in some sense either inhabited or been oriented toward the social roles I discussed above. I’m going to try to step back from those roles, to a considerable extent. I suppose what I’m saying is that the blog up until now has been principally oriented to the discussion of intellectual content, whereas now the blog will also be more about me, the person who happens to be producing this content. This is, I think, what a lot of people use their intellectual blogs for already – so in that sense I’m just saying, again, that this is going to become a more personal blog.
At the same time, I’m not particularly interested in using the blog for socialising, etc. My plan is really to use the blog for a potentially slightly more exposing task: talking about the kinds of things, in personal and social life, that often can’t easily be articulated in more regular social or professional environments. Such difficulty of articulation is at least partly because of reputational risk – and reputational risk is obviously a large issue online. Nevertheless, the portability of online content – its relative lack of necessary connection to any specific discursive space – allows I think some possibilities of articulation that are foreclosed in the discourses of many smaller and more specifically grounded discursive communities. At any rate, I’d like, among other things, to explore here some things that are typically, I think, difficult to articulate in at least certain social spaces I’m familiar with.
I think this post basically covers my thinking about the transition to a more personal blog. Now to get on with it.
October 1, 2010
I mostly seem to be using the blog to commit myself to long term projects lately. Here’s one more. I’ve mentioned a few times before wanting to do a systematic study of theories of economic value across different economic traditions. (Classical; Marxian; Marginalist; etc.) I’m going to promote this inchoate desire to definite project status. If the world were arranged for my pleasure, I’d get a PhD scholarship to pursue it. Regardless, I won’t start on it for a couple years, I don’t think. My hope is that this project will serve as a useful clarificatory and orienting device, as I try to work my way in to formal economic theory.
To sum up, I have a three-pronged attack at the moment:
1) Social theoretic foundations.
2) History of capitalism.
3) Value theory.
The first two take explanatory priority over the third: the operating historical materialist framework (to be elaborated in (1)) assumes that economic value is a phenomenon produced by specific socio-historical conditions and dynamics (to be elaborated in (2)). (3) will argue that most economic theory reifies economic value, in ways that obscure its real socio-historical content, and the socio-historical dynamics that produce it. This critique will then be leveraged, in a putative (4), (5), and so on, to a discussion of contemporary economic theory and reality.
This all sounds enormously banal and commonplace, stated at this level of abstraction. And indeed my aim is accuracy, not originality: if the output of these projects entirely replicates others’ work, that will be just fine by me. Still, there may be some originality of synthesis by the time the whole lot’s done.
I’ll also probably continue to write some philosophical material, partly because it interests me, but also because an important claim of (1) is that a lot of philosophical questions are resolvable from a perspective that is social-theoretic rather than metaphysical: elaborating this will probably involve some philosophical discussion.
It’s taken me a great deal lot of work to get to this point, where I can clearly state the structure and trajectory of the larger project: I started blogging three and a half years ago. But I think that work has been useful. There are, I should add, plenty of things I need to do that don’t directly fall into any of the categories mentioned: for example, I need to get my head around the mathematics of econometrics and equilibrium modelling before I can begin (3) properly. But as I say, these are all long term projects.
Owen Hatherley’s long promised opus-post on Pulp has finally arrived (in the first of several installments), and I’m weeping just to read it. Too much to say that Owen’s saying better; click through.